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Abstract 
The narrow definition of contract of employment developed by the common law tests 
has given room for employers to avoid protective legislation for the people that work 
for them. In the current economic climate that we face today, the impact of 
globalisation and the UK government’s response to the 2008 economic crash has 
made this problem far worse that it has been at other points in history. This deep, 
structural problem requires Parliamentary intervention as the courts have failed to 
reform the definition of the contract of employment effectively. This article will assess 
the role of Parliament and the judiciary and discuss which institution should take the 
primary role in reform of the contract of employment. 
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Introduction 
This article will assess the relationship between the judiciary and Parliament in 
relation to the definition of employment status and discuss whether Parliamentary 
intervention is needed. To look at this issue in enough detail, I will explain how the 
courts have developed the common law tests which define employment status 
before moving on to why the distinction between an employee and a worker is so 
fundamental for access to employment rights. Then I will contrast – and focus on – 
the current role of the judiciary and the role of Parliament and consider what their 
roles should be. This article will show that the judiciary are stuck in a strict 
interpretation of contract law and that Parliament, or more precisely, the government, 
seems to want to further weaken employment rights. Despite this, this article does 
conclude that Parliamentary intervention (however likely it may be) is the logical 
answer to the question of the definition of the contract of employment due to the 
societal importance of this area of law.  Finally, I will look at the effects of the current 
economic climate on the definition of an ‘employee’ and how employers may use the 
current definition and the relationship between the judiciary and Parliament to exploit 
workers – both UK nationals and migrants – for self-profit.  
 
The Common Law Tests for Employee Status 
The courts in this country have long had the task of defining who an employee is. 
This stems from the court’s interpretation and application of master and servant laws 
in which magistrates would have to distinguish between: contracts for service, and 
contracts of service. With contracts of service, there were various laws imposed on 
the servants and their masters, as such, “the common law attempted to draw a sharp 
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distinction”1 between the two. This distinction – although master and servant laws 
were repealed2 - is still relevant today as the way that the courts distinguish between 
an employee and other worker statuses have taken ideas from the older tests that 
judges developed. Early legislation on the issue required courts to do this3. However, 
as Deakin explains, “the [unitary model of the] contract of employment, […] was only 
clearly adopted when further reforms were enacted to social legislation, [such as the] 
National Insurance Act 1946.” 4  This lead to “the fundamental division between 
employees and the self-employed”. 5  This way of defining employees was also 
adopted “under the employment-protection legislation that was introduced first in the 
early 1960s”6 and still appears in today’s current legislation. 
To help distinguish between who was and was not an employee, the courts 
developed the ‘control test’. This was illustrated in the case of Lane v Shire Roofing 
Company (Oxford) Ltd,7 where Henry LJ defines the control test as, “who lays down 
what is to be done, the way in which it is to be done, the means by which it is to be 
done, and the time when it is done? Who provides […] the material, plant and 
machinery and tools used?”.8 Although these examples are still considered indicative 
of an employment contract, Deakin expresses that “the control test itself came to be 
regarded as excessively artificial and gave way to the tests of ‘integration’ and 
‘business reality’”.9 In conclusion, the control test now has less use in modern cases 
concerning the contract of employment. This is partly because the modern work 
force is seen to be less controlled by their employers with precarious and less 
                                                        
1
 Hugh Collins, K.D. Ewing, Aileen McColgan, Labour Law (Cambridge University Press 2012) 190. 
2
 Master and Servant Act 1889, s 2. 
3
 Master and Servant Act 1867, s 2. 
4
 Simon Deakin, ‘The Contract of Employment: A Study in Legal Evolution’ (2001) 11 Historical 
Studies In Industrial Relations 1, 32. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 [1995] PIQR 417 (CA). 
8
 Ibid, 422. 
9
 See Deakin (n 4) 33. 
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structured work being more common and increasing. This form of work will be looked 
at later in the article as one example of why Parliamentary intervention is needed. 
As previously mentioned, the two newer tests 10  “stressed economic, as 
opposed to personal, subordination as the basis of the contract of employment”11 
and are summarised by Cooke J when he says that:  
 
factors which may be of importance are […] whether the man 
performing the services provides his own equipment, whether he hires 
his own helpers, what degree of financial risk he takes, what degree of 
responsibility for investment and management he has.12  
 
The replacement of the control test by the courts demonstrates the fluidity of how the 
labour workforce and circumstances changed and how the courts adapted to this 
change. Over time, more employers were relaxing their rules on control over their 
employees - a new way to assess whether someone was an employee was needed 
and was fulfilled by the business risk/reality test. 
The second of these tests, the ‘integration test’ is “the test of a worker’s 
‘integration’ into an organization”.13 It “was used to explain how professionals such 
as doctors and journalists could be classified as employees notwithstanding the high 
degree of autonomy that they enjoyed in their work”.14 This widening of the different 
tests adapted by the court, enabled judges to evolve the law with the changing 
nature of work routines and business organisation with the evolution of employment 
protection. 
                                                        
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Market Investigations v Minister of Social Security [1969] 2 QB 173, 185. 
13
 See Deakin (n 4) 33. 
14
 Ibid. 
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However, after these cases were ruled, it was easy for employers to insert 
clauses within their contracts to hint at aspects that suggest that the contract is a 
contract for service and not a contract of service. The courts must decide whether 
such a contract is a sham. The courts “will not be much influenced by an explicit 
statement that the contract is one of employment or a contact for services”15 as 
illustrated by McMeechan v Secretary of State for Employment,16 and in a recent 
case, the Supreme Court ruled that the courts must consider “the relative bargaining 
power of the parties […] in deciding whether the terms of any written agreement in 
truth represent what was agreed”.17 It is clear that the courts are trying to expand 
what aspects they will consider indicative of whether the contract at hand is one of 
employment rather than relying on a written agreement between the two parties. 
These tests have been described by legal scholars as “a maze of casuistry”18 
and according to Hepple: 
 
an attempt was bravely made in 1968 by MacKenna J. […] to bring 
some order into the chaos by asking, first, whether there is a sufficient 
degree of control to make the worker an employee, and then asking 
whether the provisions of the contract are ‘consistent with its being a 
contract of service.19  
 
                                                        
15
 Hugh Collins, K.D. Ewing, Aileen McColgan, Labour Law (Cambridge University Press 2012) 195. 
16
 [1997] ICR 549. 
17
 Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher [2011] UKSC 41; [2011] ICR 1157, para 35. 
18
 Bob Hepple, ‘Restructuring Employment Rights’ (1986) 15 ILJ 69, 72. 
19
 Ibid. 
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in the case of Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions and 
National Insurance.20 This is where we are now – a mix of different tests which 
provide no sharp boundary between a contract of service and a contract for service. 
 
The importance of distinguishing between the contract of service and the 
contract for service 
As observed, the courts have spent a long time developing the tests they can use to 
distinguish between the two types of contract. It is necessary to understand why this 
is the case. Many scholars have highlighted that “nearly all the statutory rights 
created since the 1960s are limited to the ‘employee’ under a ‘contract of 
employment’”.21 It is therefore “the gateway to most employment-related protection 
at common law and under legislation”.22 The statutes use terms such as: employee, 
workers and personal service contracts to set the scope of what types of people the 
legislation is intended to protect. The definition of an ‘employee’, found under the 
Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996) is “an individual who has entered into or 
works under […] a contract of employment”.23 This definition is clarified further by 
defining a contract of employment as “a contract of service or apprenticeship, 
whether express or implied, and […] whether oral or in writing”.24 
It is clear from the statutory definitions that the legislator has left it to the 
judiciary to define these terms more precisely. This is likely due to the courts long-
established history of interpreting the distinction between the two (as demonstrated 
by the history of the case law in this area). It poses the question of whether 
                                                        
20
 [1968] 2 QB 497. 
21
 See Hepple (n 18) 69. 
22
 J. Fudge, E. Tucker, L. Vosko, ‘The Legal Concept of Employment: Marginalizing Workers’ (Report 
for the Law Commission of Canada, York University 2002) 8. Even though this is a Canadian report, it 
is relevant to the United Kingdom’s legislative structure of labour law. 
23
 ERA 1996, s 230(1). 
24
 Ibid, s 230(2). 
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Parliament have left it to the judiciary or, whether they allowed the judiciary to 
continue in this area of the law as they have done in the past? The fact that such a 
crucial area of labour law – the qualifying boundary to access rights – is in a grey 
area is worrying. The common law tests that have been described are not very 
consistent and have been constantly changing and evolving over their existence 
which has implications for both employers and employees.  
It is clear then, that there needs to be a clearer and simpler system of defining 
an employee under a contract of employment from workers under personal service 
contracts. The key question of this article is therefore, who should do this – 
Parliament or the judiciary? 
Who should define the employment contract? 
Parliament? 
Labour law at first glance seems to be focused on contract law – a common law 
creature. As previously discussed, one of the “objects of labour law [is] the contract 
of employment between employer and worker”.25 However, this should not distract 
us from the political and social impact of that definition. The “employment relation 
lies at the centre of a fundamental conflict of interest […] [of] capitalist societies”26 
and therefore we must consider the contract of employment distinction as being 
wider than a merely contract law problem because “it is important to study the legal 
rules in their economic, social and political context”. 27  From this angle, it is 
questionable whether our judiciary – who should be politically neutral – should be 
forced to define a term which has far reaching political and social consequences. 
                                                        
25
 Hugh Collins, K.D. Ewing, Aileen McColgan, Labour Law (Cambridge University Press 2012) 4. 
26
 Ibid, 5. 
27
 Ibid. 
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Legal academics have observed that “the common law plays a diminishing role”28 in 
shaping the contract of employment. 
From the common law tests, it can be said that the courts have been 
struggling to keep pace with the fast-paced environment of the workplace. Hepple 
heavily criticises the common law method by saying that:  
 
any attempts to rationalise the coverage of legislation or to simplify the 
law so that it can be understood by employers, workers and tribunals, 
[…] or to make workers' rights more effective, are bound to collapse if 
they are built on the corner-stone of the common law.29  
 
This is a heavy criticism of our employment rights legislation and makes it clear why 
Parliament needs to change its stance on the contract of employment. Hepple 
compares our method of structuring employment rights around contract law, with 
other European countries, noting that the “development of labour law in several 
European countries has been based on the realisation that the employment 
relationship had to be freed from the law of contracts and of property”.30 It seems a 
logical step forward to break free from the shackles of English contract law which is 
both archaic and unsuited to governing the politically charged and socially impactful 
area of labour law.  
It is therefore clear that Parliament should intervene. However, this leads us 
on to a fundamental question which needs to be discussed – how should Parliament 
intervene? What should Parliament do to change the problems highlighted? 
                                                        
28
 Ibid, 9. 
29
 See Hepple (n 18) 83. 
30
 Ibid. 
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There has been a significant amount of academic focus on this point and I will 
consider what multiple academics have to say in this area about how Parliament 
should intervene in labour law. The overall aim of these various articles is to try to 
solve the:  
 
widespread agreement that the traditional legal categories – 
‘employee’, ‘independent contractors’, ‘contract of service’, and 
‘contract for services’ – no longer fit with the economic and social 
reality of work relations.31  
 
The first scholar I will look at is Freedland, who is one of many to consider the 
reshaping of our labour law legislation. The core idea he says, is “about moving from 
the Contract of Employment to the Personal Work Contract as a central organising 
category for the discussion of the law of the individual relationship”. 32  He first 
suggested this in his book, The Personal Employment Contract when he says that 
we need to extend “the scope of the work to include other personal work or 
employment contracts”.33 Freedland realises that the fact that “employment lawyers, 
[…] approach this diverse world entirely from the contract of employment outwards”34 
means that there “is a problem which is not just an academic or theoretical one […] 
[but that the] problem may have consisted in the lack of a well-defined contractual 
basis or pattern for such arrangements”. 35  Furthermore, such problems are 
widespread in the world of sporting fixtures and sportspersons, […] people working 
                                                        
31
See J. Fudge, E. Tucker, L. Vosko (n 22) 93. 
32
 Mark Freedland, ‘From the Contract of Employment to the Personal Work Nexus’ (2006) 35 ILJ 1, 
2. 
33
 Mark Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (OUP 2003) 1. 
34
 See Freedland (n 32) 6. 
35
 Ibid. 
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in entertainment and in the media and also to a growing army of people providing 
consultancy services and stand-in services of every kind.36  
This should bring the attention of Parliament to redefine who is protected by 
employment legislation as the labour laws are leaving a lot of people without 
protection. Freedland neatly summarises a list of workers that are on the edge of 
being under a contract of employment but ultimately fall short: “examples of such 
types or descriptions are those of ‘free-lancers’, ‘consultants’, ‘casuals’ (‘regular’ or 
otherwise), ‘on-call workers’, ‘outworkers’ or ‘homeworkers’, ‘gang workers’, ‘contract 
workers’ and ‘agency temps’”.37  Freedland suggests that this is the reason why 
legislative intervention is needed. 
That article notes that the widening of the scope of employment legislation 
has already happened in some areas, for example the “National Minimum Wage Act, 
like the Working Time Regulations, applies not just to employees with contracts of 
employment but to other workers as statutorily defined”.38 Although the definition of 
‘worker’ is defined as: 
 
an individual who has entered into or works under, (a) a contract of 
employment; or (b) any other contract […] to do or perform personally 
any work or services for another party to the contract whose status is 
not by virtue of the contract that of a client or customer of any 
profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual39  
 
                                                        
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Ibid, 9. 
38
 Ibid, 21. 
39
 ERA 1996, s 230(3)(a), (b). 
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it is still not as wide as the scope that Freedland is suggesting. Critics would argue 
that widening the scope beyond that of ‘worker’ would be problematic, however, 
Freedland argues that the fact legislation has already been widened, suggests that 
this “helps to show why this might be non-problematical, by challenging our fixation 
with the contract of employment”40 even further by using the personal work contract 
as the scope of employment legislation. 
Freedland is not the only legal scholar to consider this. Deakin has “take[n] up 
Freedland’s challenge to reconceptualise the employment relationship as a ‘personal 
employment contract’”.41 He also notices that the contract of service “has certainly 
undermined its relevance from the late-1970s onwards”42 due to “the development of 
the debate about labour market flexibility, coupled with the emergence of ‘post-
industrial’ forms of employment”.43 Just for clarification, Deakin highlights the fact 
that “Freedland’s proposal does not equate to saying that all ‘independent’ workers 
should be subsumed into the protective coverage of labour laws, simply the 
dependent self-employed”44 and that this should be the aim of legislative reform. 
Again, following the legislation which focuses on the term ‘worker’, 45  Deakin 
observes that the “purposive approach to interpreting the ‘worker’ term which the 
EAT had adopted […] has been disapproved in a dictum of the Court of Appeal”.46 
Not only is this a reason for the need for legislative intervention but the fact that “the 
introduction of the ‘worker ’ concept has arguably exacerbated, and certainly not 
improved, this situation”47 and that therefore the UK’s labour law “need[s] […] the 
                                                        
40
 See Freedland (n 32) 21. 
41
 Simon Deakin, ‘Does the ‘Personal Employment Contract’ Provide a Basis for the Reunification of 
Employment Law?’ (2007) 36 ILJ 68. 
42
 Ibid, 69. 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Ibid, 75. 
45
 See n 37. 
46
 See Deakin (n 41) 79. 
47
 Ibid. 
KENT STUDENT LAW REVIEW Volume 3 2017 
12 
 
kind of fundamental conceptual reorientation within the law which Freedland argues 
for”,48 also requires attention. Deakin is therefore calling for a widening of labour law 
and this simply cannot be done by the judiciary as they are limited to the current 
definitions within the relevant employment statutes that have been mentioned. 
Ultimately, he calls for the Law Commission to conduct a  
 
re-examination of concepts in governing the employment form, in the 
context of employment, social security and fiscal law, with comparative 
insights where necessary […] and a Beveridge report for our own 
times, one which would set out the values which should inform 
legislative change in this area49  
 
which would lead to “a ministerial or parliamentary review”50 of the scope of labour 
law. 
From these two highly respected labour law scholars alone, it is clear that in 
recent years the criticism of the courts – to come up with a solution for the lack of 
keeping pace with the changing world of work – has resulted in calls for 
Parliamentary intervention and a reshaping of the scope of relevant employment 
laws around a different fixation. From this, it can be concluded that the courts have 
had their chance to develop this law without the need for Parliament, but they have 
failed to do this. Thus, Parliament must act on this to keep the UK’s labour laws 
effective and protective to all who should be protected – the dependant self-
employed. 
 
                                                        
48
 Ibid. 
49
 Ibid, 83. 
50
 Ibid. 
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The Judiciary? 
In this section I will demonstrate how the courts have failed to change the definition 
of the contract of employment and its central position for access to labour law 
protection despite being given a number of opportunities to do so, thus leaving the 
issue for parliament to resolve. 
The court’s interpretation of certain key cases, which were highlighted by 
Langstaff51 shows just how narrow the judiciary has been. The first of his examples 
was Halawi v WDFG UK Ltd t/a World Duty Free.52 This case was to do with World 
Duty Free ceasing their sponsorship with the claimant on ground of racial 
discrimination. The Court of Appeal ruled that World Duty Free could do this as the 
claimant was not a ‘worker’ using the case of Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) 
Ltd v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance53 which Langstaff summarises the 
decision that, “to be a contract of employment the contract must provide for personal 
service in return for payment, subject to the control (in the sense of direction) of the 
employer, at least insofar as there is room for it, provided other features of the 
contract do not negate it as being one of employment”.54 The claimant was also not 
“a worker, for section 83(2) of the Equality Act requires [which] personal service”.55 
In effect, the meaning of this ruling allowed World Duty Free to discriminate a 
dependant self-employed person on the ground of religious belief – something which 
the courts should be ashamed of. Langstaff writes that “It is worth reflecting that all 
                                                        
51
 Sir Brian Langstaff, ‘Changing Times, Changing Relationships At Work . . . Changing Law?’ (2016) 
45 ILJ 131. 
52
 [2015] IRLR 50 (CA). 
53
 [1968] 2 QB 497. 
54
 See Langstaff (n 51) 137. 
55
 Ibid.  
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the judges who heard the case on appeal […] expressed unease that a 
discriminatory wrong might have been done which the law could do nothing to 
remedy.”56 However, this assessment is hard to justify. After all, it was the courts that 
developed the narrow definition of a contract of service and ‘worker’ – it could be 
argued that it should be the courts job to rectify this narrow definition.  
The lack of judicial creativity in this case is concerning. The circumstances of 
the claimant made it so that there was no contract between herself and World Duty 
Free, but only between the claimant and a third party. However, to overcome this 
problem, the Court of Appeal could have simply evaluated the circumstances of the 
case and realised that the claimant was not – apart from on paper – an independent 
self-employed person but was in fact, in all the circumstances, subject to a 
contractual relationship akin to that of a contract of employment. This approach to 
legal problems has been shown elsewhere in law. For example, in land law, when 
deciding on whether a lease or a licence exists, the courts look at what is happening 
‘on the ground’ and not what is written on paper.57 It would not be revolutionary for 
judges to adopt a similar approach to this area of contract law as this has already 
been achieved in the lease-licence distinction which is also rooted in contract law. 
A similar point of law was determined in O’Kelly v Trusthouse Forte58 where 
the claimant was classified as being an independent contractor (outside the scope of 
most protective labour laws) rather than a dependant self-employed person. The 
EAT originally held that they were employees because of this economic 
dependence. In the previous case and in O’Kelly v Trusthouse Forte, the Court of 
Appeal refused to expand the definition to allow protection for the dependant self-
employed. Therefore, it seems that the EAT and the Court of Appeal are conflicting 
                                                        
56
 Ibid. 
57
 Street v Mountford [1985] AC 809. 
58
 [1984] QB 90 (CA). 
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with each other which needs to be solved – the most practical way is by changing 
the law from above (Parliamentary intervention) so there is no need for judicial 
conflict.  
The last case I will consider is that of Quashie v Stingfellows Restaurants 
Ltd.59 The set up between the claimant and her employer was that of a lapdancer 
and the club which allowed her to dance at their premises for a fee. The club 
required customers to pay the dancers with ‘heavenly money’ which the club then 
converted into money to give to the dancers. The claimant was dismissed and she 
brought an unfair dismissal procedure forward – which requires the person claiming 
to be under a contract of employment. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the EAT 
ruling that “there was a contract, […] but the critical question was whether the nature 
of the contractual obligations made it a contract of employment”.60 They held that 
“there was no obligation to pay her anything at all; she negotiated her own fees with 
clients, and took the risk that she might be out of pocket on any night”.61 The Court 
of Appeal disagreed with the EAT yet again with the same issue – not allowing 
dependant self-employed persons access to rights for which many legal scholars in 
labour are currently arguing for.62 
In conclusion, the three cases shown demonstrate the difficulty the highest 
courts in the country have with progressing the law in this area forward. Langstaff 
echoes the calls from Freedland and Deakin when he says, “primacy could be given 
to ‘the employment relationship’ rather than the need for contract”. 63  However, 
Langstaff makes a powerful point in the last line of this article when he realistically 
                                                        
59
 [2012] EWCA Civ 1735. 
60
 See Langstaff (n 51) 139. 
61
 Ibid. 
62
 See Freedland (n 32) and, Deakin (n 41).  
63
 See Langstaff (n 51) 142. 
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comments on whether the courts should even be developing this part of the law as it 
is not within their remit to do so by saying:  
 
Though all of us, by virtue of our discipline and practice have an 
interest in the development of employment rights, we have to 
remember we may not always share these with every politician, some 
of whom may see our approach as imposing an albatross around the 
neck of enterprise upon which a decent and worthwhile life depends, 
even if a decent and worthwhile job does not.64 
 
I would argue that the judiciary could take small steps to achieve a wider and fairer 
definition of the employment contract and possibly even to expand the definition to 
the ‘employment relationship’. However, as it will be later examined, it is not the 
judiciary that have been ‘eroding’ employment rights and access to justice amongst 
other aspects, it is the 2010-2015 Coalition Government that is responsible for this. It 
therefore seems that although many legal scholars and perhaps judges would like to 
expand and give security to more people, the government does not. This is further 
highlighted by the rise in ‘zero-hour contracts’. Until Parliament wishes to give 
stronger employment protections, it should arguably not be changed by an unelected 
and unaccountable judiciary. This gives a clear view that Parliament should be the 
institution to change the contract of employment, not the judiciary. 
 
 
 
                                                        
64
 Ibid, 143. 
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Is the Current Economic Climate Exacerbating the Problem? 
Globalisation and migrant labour 
Globalisation has impacted many areas of our lives; labour law and the workplace 
have been no exception. As Kaufmann explains, “globalisation has several effects in 
the world of work: it entails new markets, new products, new mindsets, new 
competencies and new ways of thinking about business”.65 Globalisation could be 
defined as the weakening of physical borders between countries, yet remaining 
politically and possibly legally distinct.66 This requires businesses to compete and 
operate on many different levels, both national and international. For example, a 
company’s main market may be in the UK, but their production line may be in China 
or Bangladesh. This means they must abide by both UK laws and the laws in other 
countries where they operate.  This puts pressures on businesses as they “have to 
[accommodate] different cultures and religions”67 and be “aware of local differences 
and particularities”68 from all over the world. This may seem irrelevant to many UK 
workers, but their employers are often on the lookout to exploit cheaper labour 
elsewhere. This is because the “business community is pushing hard […] for rapid 
changes in business strategy to be made without the hamper of legal rules”.69 The 
exploitation of workers by businesses can be seen by the modern trend to outsource 
labour to countries with lower labour standards such as China or India and therefore 
will break or ignore labour regulations to achieve this. It may not seem relevant to UK 
labour law and the contract of employment, but the government could use this as a 
reason to weaken employment rights in the UK to attract business from abroad. 
                                                        
65
 Christine Kaufmann, Globalisation and Labour Rights (Hart Publishing, 2007) 7. 
66
 Jost Delbruck, ‘Structural Changes in the International System and its Legal Order: International 
Law in the Era of Globalisation’ (2001) 11 Schweizersche Zeitschrift fur Internationales und 
Europaisches Recht (Swiss Journal for International and European Law) 1, 16.  
67
 Ibid. 
68
 Ibid. 
69
 Ibid. 
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However, it could alternatively use this as a platform to work towards global 
improvement of labour standards. 
Not only has globalisation caused businesses to exploit cheap labour 
elsewhere, but migrant labour is also a way for businesses to ignore labour laws in 
the UK. Shelley has a fascinating book which explores this subject. It looks at the 
recent phenomena of a large amount of migrant labour being available to UK 
businesses and the possible causes behind this. At the time of writing, Romania and 
Bulgaria were joining the European Union and this had the effect of cheap labour 
migrating to higher-wage economies such as the United Kingdom, Germany and 
France. The same principles of this book could also be applied to the more recent 
influx of migrant labour resulting from the refugee crisis in Syria. Shelley recognises 
that “agricultural produce and major construction projects, by their very nature […] 
has militated towards informality in workplace arrangements”70, this of course being 
the avoidance of labour regulations. This has been exacerbated in the current, post-
2008-crash economy, as businesses are trying to cut costs by defining these people 
as personal contractors so they have little responsibility over them. It is easier for 
businesses to exploit migrant labour as they also tend to have little understanding of 
UK labour law and some of the time, the English language. Globalisation further 
exacerbates this effect as “poverty in rural China, unemployment in Poland, 
orphanhood in Nigeria are transformed into the use and abuse of people we sit next 
to on the bus”.71 The exploitation of migrant labour is certainly aided by the lack of 
protections offered to those who are not by definition ‘employees’. However, the 
problem is far deeper and more integral to society than just the definition of the 
employment contract itself.  
                                                        
70
 Toby Shelley, Exploited Migrant Labour in the New Global Economy (Zed Books London 2007) 41. 
71
 Ibid, 43. 
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Firstly, the diminishing funds of access to justice make taking an employer to 
a tribunal hard for those with limited funds as introduced under the 2010-2015 
Coalition government.72  As well as this, reliable free-to-access sources such as 
Citizens Advice and ACAS, are only available to read online in English or Welsh. 
Both obstacles prevent many people, especially exploited migrant labourers, from 
accessing both the legal system and information to aid themselves. These problems 
go far beyond the definition of the contract of employment, and thus, the scope of 
this article, but I hope that they highlight the extent of the problem and how the 
contract of employment is certainly a fundamental concept in providing protections, 
but is also surrounded by larger problems in society. It is this reason for why the 
judicial system is not capable of solving the exploitation of the definition of the 
contract for employment. Even if it took a step forward, larger problems would still 
prevent any real improvement for those exploited.   
It only takes a quick look at tragedies such as ‘Morecambe Bay’ to realise how 
awful worker exploitation can be and why Parliamentary involvement is necessary. 
At ‘Morecombe Bay’, twenty-three Chinese migrant labourers drowned to death as 
they were picking cockles as the Bay trapped them when the tide came in. They 
were being overworked and underpaid by their employers. They would be classed as 
workers or self-employed and thus, they would have little protection under the 
current system if they took their case to court before the tragedy. Although the 
narrow definition of the contract of employment is not the cause of this terrible event, 
the fact that migrant labourers were being exploited under the current law speaks for 
itself and is why we must change it with Parliamentary authority immediately. 
                                                        
72
 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. 
KENT STUDENT LAW REVIEW Volume 3 2017 
20 
 
This part of my article has highlighted the negative effects of globalisation on 
labour law rights in the UK. Shelley repeats this by saying that:  
 
the ‘hunger’ for work, the ‘reliability’ and ‘flexibility’ of migrant labour are 
employers’ terms for long hours, lack of overtime bonuses, unpaid 
duties, zero hour contracts, Working Time Directive opt-outs and 
disposability of migrant labour.73  
 
In conclusion, it is clear that from this aspect of the current economic climate and the 
ever-increasing impact of globalisation calls for the need of Parliamentary regulation 
in labour law – particularly the definition of the employment contract which would 
encompass most of the described workers listed above. 
 
Post-2008-crash economy 
The economic crash has influenced the way our governments have regulated many 
laws – including labour law. Hepple observes that “the response to the financial 
crisis, which started in the USA and Britain in 2008 […] has seen drastic cuts in 
public expenditure and austerity programmes aimed at reducing the deficit”. 74 
Hepple says that “Conservative–Liberal Democrat […] Coalition Government accepts 
the verdict of the [OCED], that Britain […] has ‘one of the most lightly-regulated 
labour markets in the world’”. 75  This according to Hepple, is furthered due to 
“employment rights […] being debilitated by the protracted and painful method of 
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‘death by a thousand cuts’”.76 This cutback of regulation is due to the government’s 
response to the current economic situation which is rooted in neo-liberalism and that 
legal doctrines should aid the free market.77 It is clear that the effects of the current 
economic climate has had a negative impact on labour law rights, however, it is hard 
to conclude by saying that Parliament should intervene as it is Parliament that is the 
institution which is deregulating the employment rights legislation.  
 
Conclusion 
This article has argued that the judicial process of defining the contract of 
employment has ultimately failed to keep pace with the current world of work due to 
the lack of judicial creativity and judges being deeply rooted in the strict interpretation 
of the law of contract. This is a valid criticism because judges have previously moved 
away from strict interpretation with regards to lease-licence distinctions which 
involves a similar problem. I have very briefly compared our system of legislation to 
that of some European countries78 and stated that an overhaul of this area is needed 
– a refocus from the common law fixation on contract principles and instead on the 
‘personal work contract’ suggested by Freedland, Deakin and Langstaff. As well as 
this, the article aimed to shed light on the impact of cheaply available migrant labour 
and the exploitation that occurs in that area of society due to the gaps in protection 
provided by the current employment definition. This issue itself is worthy of 
Parliamentary action. Parliament should also intervene with regards to the definition 
of the contract of employment more broadly. This is because we should in the 21st 
century, see labour and employment law as more than a contract between two 
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‘equal’ parties and, instead see how it affects many other areas of society and 
impacts almost every single one of us.  
 
However, this article has casted doubt on whether Parliament or the 
government would be willing to intervene given cuts to legal aid and the promotion of 
the legally awkward ‘zero-hour contracts’, both of which hamper the protection of 
employees under the narrow definition of the contract of employment. In conclusion, 
it is easy enough to say whether Parliament should or should not intervene. The 
issue is large enough and has a big enough social impact for it to have Parliament’s 
attention, but to conclude knowing that Parliament is currently unlikely to change 
anything seems disappointing. Therefore, more work is needed from the judiciary to 
change what it can in the process of the courts as it has done little to offer more 
protection to people. As well as this, perhaps the Law Commission should review 
this area and set proposals for Parliament to consider, which would build pressure 
for the much-needed Parliamentary intervention.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
